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Closing Pandora’s box? The EU proposal on the regulation of robots 
 
BURKHARD SCHAFER 
 
I OF ROBOTS, MYTHOLOGY AND THE LAW 
 
“Whereas from Mary Shelley's Frankenstein's Monster to the classical myth of 
Pygmalion, through the story of Prague's Golem to the robot of Karel Čapek, who 
coined the word, people have fantasised about the possibility of building intelligent 
machines, more often than not androids with human features [...]” 
Thus starts the Motion for a European Parliament Resolution with recommendations to the Commission on Civil 
Law Rules on Robotics, submitted by the Committee on Legal Affairs. (henceforth: “the Motion”).1 
This paper will attempt a first analysis of key notions of the proposal, by following the proposers 
in exploring the emerging discourse on robot regulation through the prism of literature and 
mythology. 
The unusual and somewhat tongue-in-cheek introduction is an appropriate reminder of just how 
much our thinking about robots and their legal regulation is influenced by their depiction in 
mythology, literature and film. For centuries, we have projected our hopes and fears into human-
like machines, seeing in the back-reflection from their metallic (typically) faces an account also of 
what we are or as what we see ourselves. Law and legal regulation plays a consistent theme in these 
stories, as we will see below.  
 
II CLOSING PANDORA’S BOX 
 
A reference missing from the Motion is that to the story of Pandora.When juxtaposed to the 
Genesis account of Eve and the Fall, we get a first idea of the concerns that the committee tries to 
address. Pandora was created by Hephaestus, blacksmith to the gods and master-engineer. She was 
designed with one purpose in mind – punishing mankind for acquiring the fire from the gods. Built 
to allure and to seduce, her task is to deliver the jar that contains all the evils in the world, 
"burdensome toil and sickness that brings death to men". Only hope remains in the jar before she 
closes it again.  
The story told by Herodotus bears some striking resemblances, but also a crucial difference to that 
of the Biblical Eve. Eve too is designed – though maybe better described as bioengineered. She 
too will bring through her actions toil, sickness and disease into the world. But unlike Pandora, 
                                                        
1 Motion for a European Parliament Resolution with recommendations to the Commission on Civil Law Rules on 
Robotics [2016] 2015/2103(INL) <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-
//EP//NONSGML%2BCOMPARL%2BPE-582.443%2B01%2BDOC%2BPDF%2BV0//EN>. 
who acted strictly according to her instructions, with Eve it is the ability for autonomous decision 
making and with that the ability to act in ways unforeseeable to her creator that causes the harm.  
Today we find the same topoi in the highly gendered depiction of robots in film -  Ava, the robot 
in Ex Machina, just like Pandora is designed to seduce, just like Eve ultimately through her 
autonomy bringing doom on the naïve man she interacts with. Maybe even more worrying, real 
life examples of robotics follow the same patterns, with the female Siri and Tay playing the role of 
secretary, while the male chatbot Ross2 delivers proper legal advice.  
Exploring how gender and fear shape our perception of robots would go beyond the scope of this 
paper.3 But Pandora and Eve, each in their own way, encapsulate the fears and concerns that 
dominate the legal debate on robotics: One is the concern that malicious designers could develop 
deadly robots intentionally to inflict harm on humans. Concerns that have led to calls to outlaw 
military application of robotics. The other is the fear that by creating entities with autonomy and 
permitting them to act in ways that may be in principle unpredictable by us, we are not only 
engaging in risky behavior, we might sever the nexus between creator and creation that allows us 
to attribute legal liability and responsibility if things go wrong. Just as Eve’s action plays a central 
role in Christian apologetics, so robot autonomy is seen as a potential “get out of jail card” that 
could be played by manufacturers or sellers if their products cause harm.  
Or, in the words of the committee on the reasons for taking action at sec. 24: 
“whereas, notwithstanding the scope of the Directive 85/374/EEC, the current 
legal framework would not be sufficient to cover the damage caused by the new 
generation of robots, insofar as they can be equipped with adaptive and learning 
abilities entailing a certain degree of unpredictability in their behaviour, since these 
robots would autonomously learn from their own, variable experience and interact 
with their environment in a unique and unforeseeable manner.”4 
The fear is that this could expose buyers and the general public to harm without recourse. It could 
equally however create uncertainty for manufacturers, sellers and investors that prevents the 
robotics industry realising its beneficial potential. Law, appropriately adjusted to this new reality, 
might be able to give us reasonable hope in a safe robotic future. Yet hope, as Pandora’s story 
shows, is an ambivalent concept. It is unclear if by keeping hope in the jar, Pandora denied us 
“even hope” and punished us even more, or if closing the lid was an act of kindness – after all, 
hope was placed by Zeus in a jar that contained all evils, and what is more evil than hope 
continuously disappointed. Is the Motion then aimed to “close the box” in the sense of keeping a 
lid on potential harm? Or is it giving us “false hope”, in that it deludes us into thinking that by 
regulating a technology we can make it safe? 
Or is the role of the proposal merely symbolic, a form of “red flag” law that does not address any 
real problem, but responds to public concerns by creating unnecessary and to a degree burdensome 
duties on robotics manufacturers, but with the advantage of increasing public acceptance of the 
technology? These are some of the themes that this paper will explore. 
 
 
                                                        
2 Karen Turner, ‘Meet ‘Ross,’ the newly hired legal robot’,  Washington Post (online),  May 2016 
<https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/innovations/wp/2016/05/16/meet-ross-the-newly-hired-legal-robot/>. 
3 See, eg, Friederike Eyssel and Frank Hegel,‘(S) he's Got the Look: Gender Stereotyping of Robots’ (2012) 1 
Journal of Applied Social Psychology 42(9), 2213-2230. 
4 Civil Law Rules on Robotics Motion, 6. 
III THE LAW AND THE GOLEM 
 
The EU Motion prominently mentions the story of the Golem as one of the oldest examples of 
man-made autonomous machines. If the Golem was the first robot, then a lawyer was the first 
roboticist. Tractate Sanhedrin 65b from the Talmud (the “cases and materials” of Jewish law) 
describe how amora (legal scholar) Rava created in the 3rd century BCE a person-like being from 
mud. Rava was one of the most influential law teachers of his time, contributing to the canon of 
Talmudic law a concept of good faith acquisition of lost/abandoned property; and to the laws of 
civil procedure a secularised notion of witness credibility assessment. That it should be a lawyer 
who created the first robot is within the Jewish religious framework entirely understandable: God 
is (perfect) law and the ultimate creator, so everyone who achieves near-mastery of the law could 
arguably also achieve near-mastery of the art of creation. Near-mastery only though, and indeed 
Rava’s robot quickly failed the Turing test: When Rava, maybe to put his work to the test, sends 
him on an errand to another influential amora, Rav Zeira, the man-machine is quickly found out. 
Incapable of answering questions directed at it, Zeira easily identifies the originator behind the 
ploy: "You were created by the sages; return to your dust".5 Then and now, the ability to display 
human characteristics when under cross-examination and responding appropriately to questions 
was the litmus test that distinguishes man from machine; then and now, mastering language turns 
out to be a difficult task to achieve. 
The idea of lawyers as arch-roboticists quickly disappears from history, though it returns briefly in 
the 19th century with an interesting twist. Legal formalism developed an ideal of the judge as 
adjudicator that saw them as machine-like in nature, working through simple algorithms, ideally 
available in codified form, to determine the right outcome without fear, favor, or any other emotion 
for that matter. Roscoe Pound dismissively termed this “mechanical jurisprudence”,6 but for some 
of its adherents this epithet would have been a source of pride rather than disparagement. Over 
100 years before Pound, Julian de la Mettrie wrote in “Machine Man”:  
“To be a machine and to feel, to think and to be able to distinguish right from 
wrong, like blue from yellow [...].”7  
Rather than making robots like their Jewish predecessors, the legal formalists of 18th Europe 
dreamt of turning themselves into machines. From this two themes emerged that are also relevant 
for the contemporary discussion on robot regulation. 
The first is the idea, central for formalist jurisprudence, that legal codes can be seen as a library of 
rules, which together with an appropriate logic form an algorithm that can determine mechanically 
the outcome of a case. This idea, which informed the development of first generation legal expert 
systems such as Taxman8 or the Latent Damage System,9 also opened up the possibility of a 
different approach to robot regulation. Rather than using law only retrospectively, after a violation 
has occurred, implementing formal representations of relevant legislation in the robot’s software 
might ensure law compliance by design. This idea was popularized in literature through Asimov’s 
famous Laws of Robotics – though we should note that their main narrative function is to create 
problems and to require workarounds. Asimov did not advocate them as a solution, if anything, 
his stories show how difficult it can be to reduce normative decision making to simple rule 
                                                        
5 David Honigsberg, ‘Rava's Golem’ (1995) 7 Journal of the Fantastic in the Arts 137. 
6 Pound, Roscoe, ‘Mechanical Jurisprudence’ (1908) 8 Columbia Law Review 8: 605. 
7 Julien Offray de La Mettrie, Man Machine and Other Writings  (Cambridge University Press, 1996) 35. 
8,Thorne McCarty, ‘Reflections on Taxman: An Experiment in Artificial Intelligence and Legal Reasoning’ (1997) 
90 Harvard Law Review 837. 
9 Richard Susskind ‘The latent damage system: a jurisprudential analysis’ (Paper presented at Proceedings of the 
2nd international conference on artificial intelligence and law (ICAIL 89), University of British Columbia, 
Vancouver, 1989) 23–32. 
following. However, the idea got traction in the legal domain. The first commercially deployed 
example was through DRM as a form of copyright law by design, and more recently through the 
“privacy by design” requirement, encouraged by implication in the EU Data Protection Directive, 
and soon to be explicitly mandated in Art 25 of the EU General Data Protection regulation.10 
Lessig’s influential (and highly critical) appraisal of software-enforced rule compliance finally 
brought the equivalence between legal and software code into the mainstream discussion on 
technology regulation.  
The Motion to the EU Commission remains deeply ambivalent on this issue. Citing explicitly 
Asimov, it states as General Principle L that 
“whereas, until such time, if ever, that robots become or are made self-aware, 
Asimov's Laws must be regarded as being directed at the designers, producers and 
operators of robots, since those laws cannot be converted into machine code;”11 
It is unclear why the committee thinks that self-awareness is a precondition for legal rule following. 
It is true that the rules in the form given to them by Asimov are too general and abstract to be 
suitable candidates for a formal capture that could guide machine behaviour. However this does 
not mean that quite sophisticated formal representations of legal norms can’t under the right 
conditions be an effective tool for robot regulation. The committee seems to recognise this when 
at sec.10, it also   
“calls, in this regard, on the Commission to foster the development of standards for 
the concepts of privacy by design and privacy by default, informed consent and 
encryption;” 
It seems clear that despite the dismissive reference to Asimov’s laws in the general part, some form 
of legal reasoning capacity will have to play a role in the tool set for efficient robot regulation. 
Given just how prevalent robotic devices are bound to become, we will therefore likely face a 
future of “ambient law”, where gadgets, cars, automated homes or smart cities constantly run 
algorithms that are isomorphic formal representations of relevant legal provisions.  
The second lesson that we can learn from the 19th century idea of turning lawyers into robots 
concerns the effect of robotics on the labour market. We find the idea that modern working 
practices are turning humans into machines prominently in Karel Čapek’s play R.U.R. from 1920, 
which the EU Motion also cites. The heroine of the book, Helena, is a representative of the 
“League of Humanity”, a human rights organisation that lobbies for employment and other civil 
rights for robots, including the right to get paid fair wages. The impact of these robots on the 
labour market and wider society is however as profound as it is ambivalent, resulting in deskilled 
humans with decreasing birth rates and ultimately little to protect them when the robot uprising 
begins. While for Čapek, robots were a metaphor for dehumanising working conditions under 
modern modes of production, the fear that robots will disrupt our labour markets and put 
additional strain on already overstretched social security systems also plays a central role in the 
current debate.12 It is also a concern in the EU proposal that states at Para 20: 
“Bearing in mind the effects that the development and deployment of robotics and 
AI might have on employment and, consequently, on the viability of the social security 
systems of the Member States, consideration should be given to the possible need to 
introduce corporate reporting requirements on the extent and proportion of the 
contribution of robotics and AI to the economic results of a company for the purpose 
                                                        
10 Regulation (EU) 2016/… of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of 
natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and 
repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation) [2016] OJ L 119. 
11 Civil Law Rules on Robotics Motion, L . 
12  See,eg, Martin Ford, Rise of the Robots: Technology and the Threat of a Jobless Future (Basic Books, 2015).  
of taxation and social security contributions; takes the view that in the light of the 
possible effects on the labour market of robotics and AI a general basic income should 
be seriously considered, and invites all Member States to do so.”13 
With this the Motion opens up for discussion two of the more radical proposals for a wider societal 
response to increased automation at the workplace. One is to abandon the notion of employment 
as the norm, and of wages as the typical form of income. Instead, a general basic income is 
suggested as an alternative should, as some commentators have predicted, the reduction in available 
jobs overwhelm existing social security networks.14 A possible source for funding of such a scheme 
is also hinted at by the EU committee. Robots could be treated as employees for tax and social 
security purposes. While not exactly getting paid, as Helena lobbied for in R.U.R, robots could be 
paying income tax – or rather a levy could be raised from companies that splits the difference 
between the reduction of costs that the company gains through automation and the costs that this 
creates for the welfare system through loss in tax revenue and increased demand for unemployment 
benefits. 
This suggestion raises an interesting philosophical question with direct legal relevance: How do we 
count robots, and how do we identify individual specimens? If a company owns one hundred cars, 
each with identical software, all communicating constantly with each other and a central server, is 
this one (distributed) robot, or one hundred? If the latter, why would an autonomous car, which 
will have several hardware and software components that constantly talk to each other and a central 
processor, not also count as several robots? Furthermore, as the software of a robot will in most 
cases require constant updating, since software ages faster than hardware. But is a robot that 
undergoes a radical change in its software still the same – or should it be considered as a new 
employee? 
Čapek’s story also brought to the fore the possibility that robots should be recognised as legal 
persons, and with that another important crossover between law, literature and robotics. Using the 
law to resolve conflicts caused by the autonomy and intelligence of machines is a recurrent theme 
in 20th century robot literature. It is through a legal trial that Commander Data in the Startrek 
universe has to prove that he is deserving of legal protection and the status of a legal person. 
Formal confirmation of citizenship and the rights and duties that it entails to the robot Johnny 
Five brings the “Short Circuit” franchise to a conclusion. These and similar stories evidence how 
much we still trust the law as a vehicle to settle social and political disputes. In a case of life imitating 
art, the mayor of Nanto City granted in 2010 the therapeutic seal robot Paro a “koseki” (household 
registry/birth certificate), which lists Shibata Takanori, Paro's inventor, as the robot's father.15  
The idea of robots as holders of rights has been mooted on and off in the academic discussion for 
quite some time, but never attracting significant support.16 A Horizon scanning report for the UK 
government however took the idea serious enough to contemplate limited civil rights for robots 
within the next 50 years.17 At first sight the EU Motion appears to follow this line of thought and 
asks to at least contemplate the possibility of  
                                                        
13 Civil Law Rules on Robotics Motion, 23. 
14 On basic income and robot technology see in particular, James Hughes, ‘A strategic opening for a basic income 
guarantee in the global crisis being created by AI, Robots, desktop manufacturing and BioMedicine’ (2014) 1 
Journal of Evolution and Technology 45. 
15 For a discussion see Jennifer Robertson, ‘Human rights vs. robot rights: Forecasts from Japan’ (2014) 46 
Critical Asian Studies 571.  
16 See, eg, Hilary Putman, ‘Robots: Machines or Artificially Created Life?’ (1964) 61 The Journal of Philosophy 
668;, David J Gunkel, ‘A vindication of the rights of machines’ (2014) 27 Philosophy & Technology 113; Mark 
Coeckelbergh, ‘Robot rights? Towards a social-relational justification of moral consideration’ (2010) 12 Ethics 
and Information Technology 209. 
17 Robots could demand legal rights (21 December 2006) BBC News 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/technology/6200005.stm>. 
“creating a specific legal status for robots, so that at least the most sophisticated 
autonomous robots could be established as having the status of electronic persons 
with specific rights and obligations, including that of making good any damage they 
may cause, and applying electronic personality to cases where robots make smart 
autonomous decisions or otherwise interact with third parties independently.” 18 
Together with the notion of robots as tax payers, this idea led commentators in the popular press 
to the conclusion that the EU is indeed preparing the ground for legal recognition of robots, 
possibly in analogy to the legal status of corporations. A more cautious reading of the proposal 
however would replace “right” in the above section with “capacity”, in particular the capacity to 
enter into legal agreements that are binding on the owner. As a simple example, we can think of 
an automated car that pays any applicable road tax “on its owner’s behalf”.  
If read like this, we can see that the discussion is far from new. At the turn of the century, advances 
in the design of autonomous agent software led to concerns about the legal status of  contracts 
that were negotiated between machines, with no or limited human oversight. The “law of electronic 
agents” workshop series that was held as part of the EU funded Agentlink network addressed these 
issues comprehensively. The emerging consensus at the time indicated that radical solutions such 
a ascribing legal personality to software agents was unnecessary, and that existing legal instruments 
were capable of dealing with machine-to-machine contract negotiations in an equitable way.19  
IV ROBOTS OR AI 
 
Why would the committee feel the need to reopen this discussion? Part of the reason is the very 
definition of “robot” that the Motion suggests, and to which we will turn our attention now.  
The Motion asks the Commission to 
“propose a common European definition of smart autonomous robots and their 
subcategories by taking into consideration the following characteristics of a smart robot:  
 acquires autonomy through sensors and/or by exchanging data with its 
environment (inter-connectivity) and trades and analyses data  
 is self-learning (optional criterion)  
 has a physical support  
 adapts its behaviours and actions to its environment” 
If adopted, the EU would be the first jurisdiction with a generic definition of robot, to be applied 
across legal domains. While a small number of jurisdictions has defined the term  “robot” in law 
for specific purposes, they typically are to be found in highly technical laws that deal with issues 
such as their treatment for tariff purposes (Russia, which uses a rather long and cumbersome 
definition), facilitate and encourage investment in robotic technology or set aside physical spaces 
where thy can be safely tested. None of these definitions play a direct role in core civil law, or are 
intended to regulate liability of/for robotic devices. The EU proposal also comes close to 
definitions used by roboticists. Mataric for instance defines robots as “ an autonomous system 
                                                        
18 Civil Law Rules on Robotics Motion,31F. 
19 See, e g, Emily Weitzenboeck, ‘Electronic agents and the formation of contracts’ (2001) 9 International Journal 
of Law Information Technology 204; Giovanni Sartor, ‘Cognitive automata and the law: electronic contracting and 
the intentionality of software agents’ (2009) 17 Artificial intelligence and law 253. 
which exists in the physical world, can sense its environment, and can act on it to achieve some 
goals.”20 
While the proposed definition is in line with that used within the technology community, 
reasonably flexible to anticipate future developments and sufficiently precise, it is nonetheless 
questionable if it is adequate for legal purposes. It is premised on the idea that there are certain 
legally problematic aspects of robots that apply across all or most applications. But are there really 
legal questions that military robots, care robots for the elderly, medical robots, automated cars, toy 
robots and advanced washing machines share? The main concern of the committee is clarifying 
civil liability, but even for such a limited objective, it seems obvious that very different rules apply 
to different types of robots, or indeed to the same type of robot used in different scenarios and by 
different actors. Some, but not all robots will simply be consumer goods, and significant parts of 
their liability hence regulated by consumer protection law. Others will be used by law enforcement 
and military, including dual–use robots, where the liability regime in many countries cerates special 
liability rules and exemptions. Medical devices and cars traditionally have their own regulatory 
regimes that already implement  some of the suggestions that the committee proposes. 
Two key components of the committee’s recommendations are a mandatory insurance scheme. 
Manufacturers or owners insure the robots against harm to the buyer and to third parties. In 
addition, a supplementary fund is suggested to cover those machines for which no insurance was 
taken out.21 In what is possibly the most innovative suggestion in the proposal, monies paid to 
robots as part of their work could directly flow into this fund, and cover it automatically in case it 
causes actionable damages. This idea of legally protected funds that “follow the robot” seems to 
be inspired by the Roman law of slavery.22 The peculium in Roman times was a fund slaves (or 
indeed sons) could be given to manage for themselves. While ultimately, they were still part of the 
property of the paterfamilias, in practice, they functioned like property of the slave and could be 
used to buy his freedom.  The committee is not suggesting this use of the peculium, nor do they 
seem to envisage a peculium that contains again other robots (the way the Roman peculium could). 
Instead, we could imagine maybe an entry into a blockchain ledger, which then would allow 
claimants with little bureaucratic efforts or cost to claim “directly” against the robot, without 
having to determine if the fault was due to software or hardware, the liability the seller’s or 
manufacturer’s.  
The second component is a mandatory registration scheme, for all robots, for the purpose of  
“...ensuring that the link between a robot and its fund would be made visible by an 
individual registration number appearing in a specific EU register, which would allow 
anyone interacting with the robot to be informed about the nature of the”23  
This too could be facilitated through blockchain ledger technology.  The problem with this 
proposal, and one that the committee tacitly admits when it asks the Commission to develop an 
appropriate classification scheme to determine which machines should be subject to such an 
approach, is that for those robots that will pose the greatest risks – medical robots and cars – 
registration and insurance systems already exist. On the other hand, a requirement to register and 
insure every individual Romba, washing machine or robotic toy dog seems vastly excessive.  
While the suggested general definition is therefore overly inclusive, and in need to be broken up 
again by the suggested classification scheme, it is in another respect overly exclusive. “Unembodied 
AIs”, intelligent software agents, are not covered by the definition. Siri or Tay the Apple and 
Microsoft chatbots, are (probably, but see below) not covered by the definition. This is problematic 
not only because AIs like these will play such a significant role in changing the way we interact with 
                                                        
20 Maja J Matarić,The robotics primer. (MIT Press, 2007) 4. 
21 Committee Motion 31 a and b.  
22 See, eg,  Ugo Pagallo, ‘Killers, fridges, and slaves: a legal journey in robotics’ (2011) 26 AI & society 26, 347. 
23 Civil Law Rules on Robotics Motion,31E. 
Information Technology. It also ignores that some of the most pressing legal issues that the Motion 
tries to address are not only the same for disembodied AI, but have been analysed, discussed and 
in some cases actioned on successfully in this field. As we saw, this is particularly the case for the 
question of legal personhood. This issue arises always when an entity, be it machine or software 
code, is not only to a degree autonomous, but also has the ability to communicate.  By excluding 
unembodied AI, the committee forgoes the chance to learn from the experience legal systems have 
made with regulating software agents. The most important of these is maybe that the status of the 
entity itself is less relevant for the discussion. What matters is the status of the speech acts they 
perform. Once we have decided we want to “count as” contractual offers machine generated 
speech, the issue of the status of the machine becomes almost irrelevant and we have the choice 
to treat it as a mere message, as  an exercise of the law of agency or indeed “directly” to a legal 
person. Similarly, if a machine utters the words “I hereby declare you man and wife”, it will be a 
question for administrative or canon law to decide if this can count as a valid performance of a 
wedding. No general definition of what a robot is in  law can or should pre-empt this discussion, 
to which different legal systems and traditions may well give different answers.  
Excluding disembodied AI from the remit of the discussion not only prevents the committee to 
learn from experience made with these devices, it also prevents a discussion of aspects of the law 
that may be in much more need of revision than contractual or even core delictual liability.  
When Tay, the Microsoft chatbot, was released on Twitter, it quickly picked up (or rather, was 
forced to pick up through a concerted effort by some users) particularly loathsome ideas and habits. 
This also means that some of its Tweets could be speech acts of a different legally relevant kind: 
defamation or criminal insult, or in jurisdictions with relevant legislation criminal hate speech or 
Holocaust denial. Nobody suggested suing Microsoft though – too obvious was the fact that “Tay 
was still learning”. In the UK, defamation is a strict liability tort however, and to bring the legal 
ideal in line with the practical reality of learning machines, one might consider carving out a “court 
jester” exemption to robot speech in those cases at least when it is clear that the utterance was a 
result of imperfect learning.  
Whenever a robot produces speech, this also creates questions for copyright law. The EU Motion 
mentions IP but briefly and concludes that in all likelihood, robotics technology is not creating 
significantly new problems. This is a surprising omission, also given the importance of IP to 
stimulating technological investment. Some robots produce works of art, for instance Taida, 
winner of the 2016 Robotart competition.24  So far, only the UK, and soon Japan, provide for 
explicit rules on the status of creative works generated by autonomous machines, and whether or 
not their approach is helping or hindering the evolution of the field needs discussion. Even more 
important than works of art, the overwhelming amount of data is generated automatically, by 
autonomous devices and through machine-to-machine communication. Some of this data has 
commercial value. If my driving trains the AI in my automated car, and the manufacturer can get 
access to this data to improve their products, do I have a proprietary interest in this data if it is not 
personal information and protected by data protection law? The commission Motion focuses on 
questions of liability, but even here IP law matters. For robots will not just be producers, they will 
also be “consumers” of IP protected work.  They are reliant on input from their environment to 
navigate, learn and improve. Some of this information will in turn be IP protected. Can a drone 
take images of famous buildings for navigation purposes and share copies with its fleet, potentially 
violating the IP rights of the architect? Can they data-mine my tweets to improve their speech? 
With these observations, our discussion turns full circle. The first robot, the Golem, lacked capacity 
to communicate. This also meant that many legal issues were pre-empted. The Motion for an EU 
initiative on robot regulation is an important step to open up the discussion on appropriate, 
harmonised responses to the robot revolution. Many of its ideas are bold and worthy of discussion, 
even if few are likely to make it into law. Yet at some crucial points, a major reassessment is 
                                                        
24 TAIDA (2016) RobotArt <http://robotart.org/archives/2016/team/taida/>. 
necessary. Neither the proposed definition of robot, nor the subsequent focus on liability, seem to 
have identified some of the most intricate problems or the most pressing legal needs. To start a 
discussion on legal regulation of robotics with references to robots in literature and mythology was 
an unusual step to take. It has significant pedagogical advantages, as it reminds us of the fears and 
hopes that mankind projects into its machines, fears and hopes that then put pressure on legislators 
to act. Yet, more might have been learned by taking these stories more seriously, with their focus 
on man-machine cooperation and with that robotic speech. Of greater concern maybe is however 
that they also create in our mind a vision of robot that for the foreseeable future will be the 
exception rather than the norm: anthropomorphic, with high degrees of autonomy, multi-purpose 
and competing rather than cooperating with humans.  For this type of robot, the committee 
proposal makes bold and innovative suggestions worth of further exploration by the EU 
Commission. But we should be concerned that by extending this regulatory approach across the 
whole range of robots, we could impede needlessly innovation and investment in some fields, or 
conversely, this over-extension of the proposal could undermine its merit in those fields where 
more radical legislative action is beneficial end needed. 
